Dan Zahavi
Oxford professor of philosophy Dan Zahavi asks whether empathy is our best base for morality? We have all been encouraged to imagine how it feels to be in someone else's shoes. But is empathy really a good base for our morality? Might there be some truth to the new arguments emerging that empathy is so biased and parochial that anybody who wishes to promote social justice should avoid it at all costs? Director of the Centre for Subjectivity Research, Dan Zahavi, probes the value of empathy.
Gives an overview of the phenomenologists definition of empathy. He says;
Affective Empathy - a popular view - is not empathy
it is affect sharing
there is not a clear explanation of what this 'sharing' means
he explores this topic
Imaginative empathy - is not empathy
Empathy is the grasp of the here and now of the expressions of the other
Empathy is one way of knowing the expressions of others.
Has the self other distinction
Empathy is not moral but is a foundation of morality.
The full video is on the IAI website behind a paywall
Otter
What are the key differences between the phenomenological account of empathy and the view of empathy as effective sharing and imaginative perspective taking?
The key differences are:
The phenomenological account views empathy as a form of understanding the expressive meaning and psychological presence of others, rather than effective sharing of emotions.
Empathy is seen as a distinct capacity from imaginative perspective taking, as the phenomenologists argue they can occur independently of each other.
The phenomenologists reject the notion of empathy as emotional sharing or contagion, arguing empathy preserves the difference between self and other rather than creating fusion.
They emphasize empathy allows a direct, experiential grasp of the other's experiences, which is different from inferring their mental states through imagination or projection.